Each entry defines a specific function or policy of Vladimir Putin that reflects the autocratic, illegal or arbitrary use of power. As far as possible, events have been arranged chronicly.
Vladimir Putin’s arbitrary political decisions, legislative manipulations and a pattern of state actions that are inspired by democratic principles or legal norms, not by personal rights, political convenience or uncontrolled executive power. These actions often reflect autocratic tendencies, where laws are interpreted or resurrected in accordance with the interests of the leader rather than the public or constitutional orders.
Putin’s arbitrariness can be seen only in the beginning of 2000, when he centralized power by appointing President’s messengers in federal districts, which weakened regional autonomy. In 2003, the aristocratic Mikhil Khodorkovski – who was the most rich person and a political rival at that time – indicated the use of judicial systems for personal or political vengeance. In the same year, independent TV networks such as NTV were brought under the control of the state, which led to a comprehensive media suppression.
The 2004 reform, which ended the direct governor elections, further clarifies arbitrariness, and was replaced by the President. In 2008, Putin became the Prime Minister, while his loyal Dimitri Medvedev was the presidential presidency, clearly a violation of the term limit. Putin then returned to the presidency in 2012 and a law extended the President’s term for four to six years, which strengthened long -term rule. The constitutional amendment of 2020 reinforced the President’s term, disregarding the earlier tenure-limit laws, probably allowed to remain in power till 2036.
These tasks define the arbitrariness of Putin, along with many other functions – which are marked by the erosion of institutional controls, manipulation in laws, repression of disagreement and concentration of power in the same leader.
1. Suppression of independent media
Vladimir Putin’s campaign to suppress independent media began soon after he came to power. One of the most symbolic and decisive moments occurred in March 2001, when the Russian government effectively took control of a major independent television channel, NTV, known for criticism of the Kremlin, especially in relation to the Second Chechen War and Government Corruption. NTV, owned by media veteran Vladimir Gusinski, was pressurized through Gazprom-Media, a subsidiary of government power company Gazprom, which used debt claims and legal threats to gain a control stake. Gusinski was forced to be deported, and NTV was subjected to pro -Kremlin.
This led to a broad pattern. Independent newspapers like Novaya Gazetta faced the murder of journalists such as threats, censorship and Anna Politkovskaya (2006). Radio stations were forced to coordinate or lose licenses with government narratives. In 2012, the Foreign Agent Act was enacted, under which foreign-funded media organizations were called “foreign agents”, which holds a serious negative meaning in Russian political culture. By 2020–2025, most independent digital media institutions such as Meduza, Dozed (TV Rain) and The Moscow Times suffered blockade, shutdown or exile. This long -term repression has greatly limited the freedom of the press in Russia and has centralized the control over national narratives under the Kremlin.
2. Mikhail Khodorkovski’s arrestÂ
On October 25, 2003, Russian security forces dramatically arrested Mikhil Khodorkovski, CEO of Yukos Oil Company and one of Russia’s wealthiest at that time. The allegations were of tax evasion and fraud, but the real purpose was considered political. Khodorkovski started giving money to opposition parties, supported the initiative of civil society and raised voice against government corruption – these were steps that directly challenged Putin’s rights.
This arrest was a significant turn in Soviet-North Russia. The collapse of Khodorkovsky was a clear warning to other elite classes: money and impact were tolerable only when they remain politically obedient. His case was filled with legal irregularities, and the human rights organizations criticized the action as inspired by politics. In 2005, he was sentenced to nine years in prison, and later, his punishment was extended due to additional allegations. International criticisms increased, but the Russian government remained uninterrupted and called it a legal matter.
The case of Khodorkovski brought a change in Putin’s rule-the cooling class was no longer a co-operator, but subordinates. After being in jail for more than a decade, Putin, in December 2013,,, just before the Sochi Olympics, unexpectedly apologized. However, the loss to Russia’s law-system and commercial environment was permanent.
3. Destruction of Yukos Oil CompanyÂ
Following the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovski in 2003, the Russian government at that time launched Russia’s largest and most transparent oil company Yukos. Using the retrospective claims, the government accused Yukos of large -scale tax evasion and fined billions of dollars, causing the company financially collapse. Yukos’s assets were confiscated, his bank accounts were blocked and its management was threatened.
In 2004, the government auctioned Yuchos’ main production unit, Yuganskanettegaz, a pre-unknown company, Back Finance Group, which later proved to be a mask of government oil company Rosneft. This trick was composed to avoid international legal response and effectively transfer properties to the state. By 2007, Yukos was completely demolished through legal and financial pressure.
This destruction fulfilled many strategic objectives: it punished political disagreement, re -established the state control over strategic natural resources, and conveyed the message that there could be no private institution more powerful than the Kremlin. Although the Russian government described it as an issue of tax enforcement, analysts and human rights groups considered it a clear example of arbitrary and politically motivated economic suppression.
4. Eradication of elections of regional governorsÂ
After the siege of Beslan School in September 2004, more than 330 people were killed, many of which were children, President Putin proposed a widespread change in the structure of Russian federalism. On September 13, 2004, he announced the abolition of direct elections for regional governors, claiming that it is necessary to strengthen national unity and prevent terrorism.
From now on, the governors will be nominated by the President, rather than being elected by the public and approved by the regional legislatures, most of which were under the influence of the Kremlin. Critics condemned the move and described it as an advantage of a national tragedy to strengthen power. It destroyed one of the remaining elements of democratic decentralization in Russia and converted the governors into loyal people appointed by Kremlin.
This reform effectively created a “vertical of power”, where the local leaders were accountable not to their voters, but to the President. This gave Putin a chance to further centralize power, which ensured that political control is equally spread in vast areas of Russia from Moscow to Far East. Although direct elections were partially restored in 2012, they were manipulated through the “municipal filter” and Kremlin’s intervention, causing the process to become unpredictable.
5. Political control over judiciaryÂ
Under the rule of Vladimir Putin, the Russian judiciary, especially by the mid-2000s, transformed into a state-control system from an independent institution. This politician reflected in high-profile matters related to opposition leaders, journalists, traders and leaders of civil society. The judges often recited harsh punishments or convened the results in favor of Kremlin, despite weak or concocted evidence.
One of the most obvious examples of this is Mikhail Khodorkovski two cases, whose results were condemned by widely inspired by politics. The judiciary also played an important role in banning opposition parties, disqualifying candidates and legalizing fraudulent elections. In cases related to Alexi Navalni, the courts continuously favored the officers and sentenced them to suspicious allegations of embezzlement and defamation.
By the 2010s, legal scholars and human rights supervisors had agreed that Russian courts had lost their independence. The judicial system has become a weapon to repression disagreement, oppression of non-governmental organizations and strengthen the ruling rule. Despite constitutional masks, in practice, in politically sensitive matters, decisions are determined not by legal qualifications, but with the choice of the executive. This erosion of judicial integrity has made Russia’s legal environment even more arbitrary and oppressive.
6. “Power vertical” principle
The term “power vertical” Vladimir Putin coined to describe a new political structure in the early stages of his presidential term, especially around 2000, to describe a new political structure for Russia, in which the power would be centralized at the federal level and especially within the presidency. The phrase became the basis of Putin’s point of view and reflects his deep doubt towards decentralized power and democratic pluralism.
This principle was gradually implemented through legal reforms, executive orders and constitutional revival. One of its early manifestations was Russia’s restructuring in seven federal districts, each of which was overseen by a President’s messenger who reported directly to the Kremlin. This helped Putin to keep more tough control over regional governors and local law enforcement agencies.
In later years, the scope of power became even stronger, especially after ending the elections of the governors in 2004. Local and regional leaders were virtually appointed by Kremlin, making them administrative subordinates rather than political representatives of their constituency. The judiciary, Parliament and Law Enforcement agencies were also included in the same vertical hierarchy, which led to the central organizational principle of allegiance to Putin.
Critics argue that this vertical hierarchy of power strangled local autonomy, eliminated political competition and reduced democratic accountability, which created a system where all decisions were taken from the top. This structure has retained and deepened by 2025, which has strengthened Putin’s personal grip on power.
7. Action on non-governmental organizations and civil society
A distinctive feature of Putin’s domestic policy has been continuous action against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent civil society workers. The first major setback came in 2006, when a new law was introduced, under which it was made mandatory for non-governmental organizations to register with the state and conduct intervention audit. This law gave the government extensive rights to monitor or close the organizations considered “undesirable” organizations.
This repression increased further with Putin’s passing “Foreign Agent Law”, soon after Putin returned to the presidency. Under this law, non-governmental organizations involved in foreign funds and vaguely defined “political activity” were required to register as foreign agents, which is a word associated with espionage and treason in Russia. Due to this designation, organizations faced heavy reporting requirements, public stigma and prosecution threats.
In 2020, the rules were further strictly administered and persons including journalists and activists were also labeled by foreign agents. Major human rights groups and environmental organizations such as Memorial, Golos were forced to stop their operations or transfer abroad. These steps crushed civil participation at the ground level and left almost no place for independent advocacy.
This repression has made Russia more hostile to international cooperation, human rights advocacy and political pluralism, which has isolated its civil society and has become completely in line with the interests of the state.
8. Parliamentary Election FraudÂ
During the tenure of Vladimir Putin, the fraud of Russia’s parliamentary elections, the opposition’s repression and the results have been widely condemned to manipulate the results. Each cycle – 2007, 2011, 2016 and 2021 – In the ballot papers, there were reliable allegations of rigging, threatening election supervisors, media censorship and excluding opposition candidates.
In 2007, Putin’s close aide, the ruling party United Russia won an overwhelming majority amid widespread allegations of fraud. The observers mentioned state pressure to present irregularities in voting, exaggeration of polling percentage and vote on government employees in a special way.
The 2011 elections began massive protests across Russia, known as the “snow revolution”. Millions of Russians took to the roads and accused the government of rigging the election. The leaked video showed disturbances in ballot papers and exit polls were completely different from the official results. In response, the state took strict action against the protesters and enacted new oppressive laws targeting protest movements.
In 2016, when most of the real opposition leaders were already marginalized, the election saw more manipulation and minimum competition. By 2021, Alexi Navalni colleagues were also barred from contesting elections and in the Moscow – especially in Moscow – created major concerns in votes.
The continuous fraud in these elections has weakened public confidence, weakened democratic institutions and ensured that Duma remains a rubber-stamp legislature, which mainly works to legalize Putin’s decisions.
9. Medvedev-Putin TandemocracyÂ
Facing the constitutional boundaries, which prohibited the presence of the presidency more than twice in a row, Vladimir Putin introduced a power-sharing system known as “Tandemocracy”. From 2008 to 2012, Putin resigned from the presidency and took over as Prime Minister, while his disciple and loyal colleague, Dimitri Medvedev, was the President.
Despite Medvedev holding the nominal post, most analysts and supervisors agreed that the real power remained with Putin, who continued to control security services, foreign policy and major government decisions. Medvedev was seen as an assistant, and the entire system was seen as a political move to bypassing the constitution without widely releasing power.
During this time, some liberal steps were taken – Madevedev spoke of modernization, freedom of internet and legal reforms. However, these efforts were limited and not transformed into systemic changes. Putin’s influence never diminished and the government machinery continued under his direction.
In 2011, Medvedev publicly announced that he would not contest again and Putin would return to the presidency. This confirmed that the pair was just a well-planned move, which weakened the integrity of the constitutional tenure limit and strengthened the notion that power in Russia is only in the hands of one person.
10. Return to the post of President and manipulation in the Constitution
Vladimir Putin officially returned to the presidency on 7 May 2012. The election process took place after a careful managed election process, which was widely criticized for competition and lack of transparency. Prior to the election, in 2008, the Constitution was amended during the tenure of President Medvedev to extend the tenure of the President from four years to six years – this step was seen as the preparation of Putin’s extended governance.
The 2012 election was surrounded by voter fraud, lack of media access to opposition candidates and allegations of state-controlled campaign. Putin got more than 63% of the votes amidst the rise of a new opposition movement led by the public’s dissatisfaction and leaders like Alexi Navalani. Large -scale protests in Moscow and other cities challenged the validity of voting, but faced strict action from the police.
Putin’s return to power marked the beginning of a more repressive phase of his presidential presidential. New laws were passed by targeting protesters, bloggers and non-governmental organizations. In the period of 2012-2025, political freedom declined dramatically and the state’s control over every aspect of the Russian society increased.
This third term extended for six years laid a more foundation of constitutional manipulation, which ended in constitutional amendments of 2020, which allowed Putin to rule by 2036, which completely eliminated the previous tenure boundaries. Return in 2012 was not just a political return – it was the beginning of a new powered era in modern Russian history.
11. Collective arrests after protests at Bolotnaya Chowk
On the eve of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential swearing in, a mass protest was held on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Chowk in Moscow. One of the largest demonstrations in the post -Soviet Union in Russia, the performance opposed the 2011 parliamentary elections and the widespread allegations of electoral fraud in the March 2012 presidential elections. Thousands of protesters gathered peacefully, but when their march route was blocked by the anti -riot police, clashes started. The officials used this conflict to justify repression.
More than 400 people were arrested that day. Over the next months and years, more than 30 people were prosecuted, known as the “Bolotnaya case”. Many people were accused of inciting collective riots or attacking police officers, although independent observers and human rights organizations found that evidences were often weak or fabricated. The cases consisted of procedural irregularities and long-term custody. Critics argue that this action was a clear warning against public assistance, and shows that peaceful protests can also cause severe punishment. The Bolotnaya case took a significant turn in Russia’s opposition landscape and showed a clear increase in the use of judiciary and law enforcement by Putin to suppress political opposition.
12. Laws banning “gay propagation”
In 2013, Vladimir Putin signed a bill banning the promotion of “non-traditional sexual relations” with minors. This law, presented as a measure of safety of children, effectively made public support for LGBTQ+ rights and discussion on homosexuality in media, schools and public programs. It was unanimously passed by State Duma and made a law signed by Putin on 30 June 2013.
Due to the vague words of the law, it could be widely implemented, resulting in censorship on books, movies and online materials as well as activists harassed and detained. Gaurav programs were banned or violently dispersed. This law also created a hostile environment for LGBTQ+ individuals, legalized social stigma and promoted hatred crimes. Human rights groups condemned this law, discriminating and violating freedom of expression. The European Human Rights Court ruled in 2017 that this law violates the European Conference on human rights.
This law has far -reaching consequences. Russian LGBTQ+ organizations were described as “foreign agents” and many were forced to close. Any positive representation of LGBTQ+ Identification for both adults and children has been banned by expanding the “gay propagation” law. This shows how Putin makes conservative values and nationalism weapons to maintain control and divert attention from political and economic issues.
13. Capture Crimea
Crimea is one of Vladimir Putin’s most adventurous and internationally condemnable acts. Russia took fast steps to control Crimea after Ukraine’s pro -Russian President Victor Yanukovich was removed from the post after mass protests in February 2014. This peninsula is a majority population of Russian origin, but legally part of Ukraine.
Initially, Russian troops wearing an uniform uniform captured major government buildings, airports and military bases in Crimea.
On March 16, 2014, between the possession and heavy publicity, a referendum in Crimea took place. It was reportedly supported by more than 90% of people to join Russia. However, this voting was widely considered illegal and illegitimate, as it was conducted without the presence of international supervisors and under military pressure. Exactly two days later, on March 18, 2014, Putin officially signed a treaty to include Crimea in the Russian Federation.
The merger violated international law including the United Nations Charter and 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia pledged to respect Ukraine’s regional integrity. Due to this, the US, European Union and other countries banned Russia and Russia was suspended from G8. This act severely spoiled Russia’s relations with Western countries and was seen as a re -disclosure of imperialist ambitions under Putin. It also promoted Putin’s domestic support despite international condemnation.
14. Support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine
After capturing Crimea, Russia also expanded its instability campaign in eastern Ukraine. In April 2014, pro -Russian separatists, with the support of secret Russian henchmen, captured government buildings in Donnetsk and Luhansk, collectively called Donbas. Although Putin denied direct involvement, enough evidence, including intelligence reports, satellite paintings and captured soldiers, confirmed that Russia was providing arms, military advisors and regular soldiers to the separatists.
This struggle turned into a long war, causing over 14,000 people to be killed and large -scale displacement. The Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was killed by the missile supplied by Russia in July 2014 further exposed the role of Moscow in the struggle. Russia continuously ruled out the responsibility and also interacted in a ceasefire talks like Minsk agreements, which were never fully followed.
This “hybrid war” strategy allowed Putin to destabilize Ukraine without formal declaration of war, aims to stop the tilt towards NATO and European Union on the west side of Ukraine. The support of separatists weakened Ukrainian sovereignty, violated international norms, and gave rise to a stable conflict that Putin took advantage of. From 2014 to the beginning of 2022, this undisclosed war fulfilled both geopolitical and domestic propagation objectives, portraying Putin abroad as protesters of ethnic Russians and opposition to Western encroachment.
15. Ban on Internet Freedom (“Sovereign Internet Law”)
“Sovereign Internet Law” came into force in Russia on 1 November 2019 on the pretext of improving cyber security and protecting national interests. In practice, it was an important step towards the construction of the government controlled and separated internet system, often called “Russian Firewall”.
This law empowered the government to control the flow of online information, monitor all Internet traffic and block access to unwanted materials or websites without court order. Russia’s media and communication regulator, Roskomnadzor, were given extensive rights to implement compliance. All internet service providers (ISPs) were required to install deep packet inspection (DPI) equipment to monitor real -time and filter the content.
This law effectively centralized the control of the infrastructure of the Internet in the hands of the state, which weakened digital privacy, freedom of expression and access to independent media. Civil rights organizations criticized it as a comprehensive surveillance and a means of censorship. This law also allowed Russia to separate its internet from the global web in an emergency or for unwarded security reasons.
By limiting digital independence, Putin strengthened the control of his rule over disagreeors, activists and independent journalism, which reveals Kremlin’s inclination towards digital totalitarianism.
16. Poisoning Alexi Navalani
On August 20, 2020, major Russian opposition leader Alexi Navalni fell seriously ill in an aircraft going from Tomsk to Moscow. The aircraft had an emergency landing in Omsk, where Navalani was admitted to the hospital. After public outrage and international pressure, he was taken to Germany for treatment. German medical authorities confirmed that he was given a military-grade nerve agent, Novichok, a military-grade navichok, developed in the Soviet Union.
The investigation conducted by independent journalists and intelligence agencies confirmed the involvement of Russian government officials in poisoning. Search outlet Belingcat along with other agencies exposed the evidence connecting the attack to members of the FSB (Federal Security Service). Despite the evidence, the Russian government denied any involvement and refused to begin criminal investigation.
The attempt to murder caused global outrage and new rounds of sanctions on Russia started. Navalni survived and publicly accused Putin of ordering an attack. The use of banned chemical weapons against a political opponent reflects the readiness of governance to eliminate threats in judicial ways. This also showed the confidence of working by Kremlin’s punishment, which resorts to refusal and misinformation to protect itself from accountability.
17. Navalani’s arrest and imprisonment
After months of health benefits in Germany, Alexi Navalni bravely returned to Russia on 17 January, 2021, despite its clear hazards to their safety. On arriving at Moscow’s Saremetayevo Airport, he was immediately arrested for allegedly violating parole conditions related to a 2014 embezzlement case. The matter was widely considered politics inspired and the European Human Rights Court had already condemned it.
On February 2, 2021, a Russian court sentenced Navalni to a punitive colony for more than two years in a punitive colony for not contacting the authorities while in a coma. The lawsuit was carried out with a severe disregard of the appropriate process, which led to protests throughout Russia, following which collective arrests and police violence.
Navalni’s imprisonment was a clear message for Putin’s critics: challenge the system, and you will be punished. His continuous imprisonment, torture reports and deprivation of medical care were received under harsh conditions. Despite this, Kremlin refused to release him and doubled Daman. The behavior of Navalani exposed the deep autocratic nature of the Putin rule and his fear towards real political opposition.
18. Constitutional amendment for unlimited tenure
In 2020, Vladimir Putin made extensive constitutional amendments, re -determined the number of his presidential tenure, which gave him an opportunity to remain in power by 2036. Although designed as part of comprehensive reforms in social and economic policy, this major change enabled them to ignore the existing two-function limit.
The referendum to approve these amendments took place between 25 June to 1 July, 2020, between Covid-19 epidemic. The voting process was irregular, forcing force, rigging in ballot papers and lack of independent surveillance. The results showed more than 77% approval, but independent observers reported extensive fraud.
Constitutional changes not only enhanced Putin’s rule, but also distinguished conservative values, prioritizing Russian law on international treaties and expanding the President’s powers. The move effectively removed all legal obstacles for his continuous rule and weakened the idea of democratic change. This marked a decisive change towards lifetime autocracy.
Putin’s move was widely condemned and it was described as a mockery of the spirit of democracy. This also revealed how control can be maintained by misusing constitutional means in ruling rule, so that in future also the political system of Russia will be dominated by Putin.
19. Attack on Ukraine
On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin made a broad attack on Ukraine, leading to the ongoing struggle into Europe’s largest war after World War II. This invasion was justified with false claims of “freedom from Nazism”, safety of Russian speakers and combating the dangers of NATO. In fact, it was an unprocessed attack on Ukraine with the aim of re -establishing Russian dominance.
This war gave birth to a humanitarian disaster, killing thousands of people and millions of people were displaced. Ukrainians such as Mariupol and Bucha became a symbol of collective atrocities and war crimes committed by the Russian Army. The international community reacted with stringent sanctions, Russian diplomatic isolation and extensive support for Ukraine.
Putin’s decision was based on his long -standing refusal of Ukrainian sovereignty and his desire to stop his alliance with the West. This invasion exposed the deep flaws of the Russian army and gave rise to internal dissatisfaction, but also took cruel action on anti-war voices.
Strategically, this invasion had the opposite effect as it strengthened NATO, Russia was isolated and damaged its economy. Nevertheless, at the domestic level, the Kremlin used this war to intensify propaganda, suppress the protest and justify further oppression.
20. Suppression of anti-war demonstrations
After the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, thousands of Russians took to the streets to oppose the war. The government responded to unprecedented repression. In the first few months, more than 20,000 people were arrested across the country. The protesters were fined, put in jail or expelled from universities and workplaces.
Putin’s rule used the word “special military campaign” instead, declaring the use of any criticism of the army or the use of the word “war” as a crime. Journalists, workers and even common citizens faced a long prison sentence for social media posts, placards or public statements. Major human rights organizations such as Memorial and Sakharov Center were closed.
The purpose of this suppression was to eradicate disagreement and create an atmosphere of fear. Many opposition leaders left the country and fled. Government media spread patriotic narratives and suppressed alternative voices. This Daman exposed the deep fear of losing Putin’s support and weakness of his narrative.
The anti-war suppression is not only a moral tragedy, but also a sign of increasing totalitarianism in Russia, where silence resisting or even a word can lead to arrest.
21. Censorship on war related information (“fake news” law)
In response to the increasing domestic and international criticism of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian state Duma passed a comprehensive censorship law on March 4, 2022. The law titled “Law on fake news” officially declares the spread of any information that reflects the official statement of the Russian government about war. According to the law, any public expression – on online, online, print, television or social media – which refers to the invasion as “war” or “invasion”, or reports Russian casualties or military actions that have not been confirmed by the Ministry of Defense, it can be called fake news. Those found guilty of spreading such “misinformation” can be sentenced to 15 years of jail.
This law effectively silenced independent journalism in Russia. Media institutions like Novaya Gazetta, TV Rain (Dazed) and Eco of Moscow either closed or moved abroad. Foreign media institutions stopped operating in Russia to avoid legal risks. Many Russian journalists left the country and fled. Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter were blocked. By controlling war-related dialogues so strictly, the purpose of the Kremlin was to end public era, suppress anti-war demonstrations, and to ensure that only government propaganda reached the Russian citizens-thus the Putin regime could be saved from internal opposition.
22. Action on those who avoid mobilization and recruitment
On September 21, 2022, President Vladimir Putin announced the “partial mobilization” of Russia’s male population in response to the huge loss in the Ukraine War. This was the first war -time recruitment campaign of Russia after World War II. This mobilization, whose official target was to call 3,00,000 reserved soldiers, soon became chaotic. Many people were admitted regardless of their experience, age or health. Some reports indicated the higher recruitment rate of ethnic minorities and rural citizens.
After this announcement, due to fear of recruitment, a large migration of Russian men started. Within a few weeks, millions of people fled to neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia. In response, the authorities began to implement strict exit restrictions, including closure of boundaries for military-class men, legal threats against recruitment and “anti-mobilization” activity. Digital summons systems were introduced in 2023 to track and send recruitment notices more efficiently.
Putin’s rule made avoiding military recruitment even more crime, increased jail sentence and gave the right to confront the property for not complying. The protesters were arrested or fined. This mobilization exposed the growing disenchantment of the people by the war and the rule of Putin. This deepened the ruling hold on citizens, making the war of war and fear of public control and fear.
23. Calling opponents as foreign agent or extremist
In 2012, after a large -scale protests against fraud in the election, Kremlin passed the “foreign agent” law, under which any organization involved in foreign funds and vaguely defined “political activity” would have to register in the state and all materials have to be identified as “foreign agents”. Originally targeted on non-governmental organizations, this law was expanded over years to include journalists, workers, human rights guards, independent media institutions and even common citizens.
By 2020, this law allowed individuals (not only organizations) to be called foreign agents. In 2022, this law was further tightened – if any person was suspected of “foreign influence” could be called a foreign agent without evidence. Additionally, many critics were declared “undesirable” or “extremists”, which could have been arrested, ruined and deported financially.
Groups like Memorial, Meduza, Golos and people like Alexi Navalani were among the targets. This labeling takes away the rights of individuals, forces them to report every transaction and publication, and make monitoring, harassment and criminal trial possible. This has effectively created an atmosphere of addiction, where freedom of expression and political participation is punished as treason, which strengthens the control of Putin on civil society through legal oppression.
24. Silence and raid independent journalists
Since returning to the presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin’s government has steadily intensified its war against independent journalism. Using raids, custody, cyber attacks, defamation cases and “foreign agent” laws, authorities have systematically demolished the independent press of Russia who have been alive alive.
A well-known journalist like Ivan Golunov, who is known for his investigative works on corruption, was arrested on concocted allegations. In 2019, Golunov’s arrest spread internationally outrage and eventually released him, but it gave a terrible message. Journalists such as Roman Badnin and Elena Milashina were harassed, beaten or forced to be deported. Institutions like TV Rain, Novaya Gazeta and Meduza faced raids, equipment seizure or restrictions on their offices, especially after publishing critical coverage of corruption in Ukraine or corruption among aristocrats.
During the period of 2022–2025, the suppression increased further. Many media platforms were forced to close or move abroad. In 2023, Putin signed a law banning cooperation with “undesirable” foreign media, which also made some media outlets illegal. Russia has become one of the most dangerous places for journalists, which has been the worst rating by reporters without borders. The state ends transparency by curbing independent journalism, the public is isolated and Putin’s powerful rule is secured.
25. Navalni dies in jail
On 16 February 2024, Russia’s most prominent opposition leader, Alexi Navalni allegedly died in jail under suspicious circumstances. Navalani was placed in the IK-3, a high-protection Arctic Penalty Colony, which is notorious for its harsh conditions. Official reports claimed that he died of “sudden death syndrome” or natural causes. However, supporters of human rights groups, Western governments and Navalni accused the Kremlin of misbehaving or poisoning them.
Navalani had earlier survived in an attempt to poison Novichok in 2020, which is widely believed that it was done by FSB (Russian Security Agency). After recovering in Germany, he returned to Russia in 2021 and was immediately arrested. He was sentenced in several fabricated charges, which was a prison sentence of more than 30 years in total.
His death proved to be a significant turn, which was condemned globally and protests started within Russia – although collective arrests soon suppressed it. The incident further strengthened Putin’s image as a leader who is willing to end the rivals through state-approved murders, and all this occurred after a long series of suspicious deaths (eg, Boris Nemeksov, Anna Politkovskaya). Navalni’s death highlighted Putin’s climax, which turned political opposition into a possible fatal act.
26. Ban on election monitoring
To ensure complete control over the election results, the rule of Vladimir Putin took strict action on independent election monitoring. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, groups such as Russia’s main independent election monitoring Golos were termed as foreign agents, were fined and prohibited entry into polling stations. Supervisors faced threatening, custody and online censorship.
By the 2024 presidential election, this action intensified. Most international monitoring bodies were denied entry or declared “undesirable”. Domestic observers were arrested, banned or their access to counting procedures was stopped. The Central Election Commission, fully controlled by Kremlin, made online polling systems unsafe for manipulation.
These actions ensured that the election results could not be independently confirmed, which confirmed the claim that Putin was rigged in voting. Opposition candidates were either banned, arrested or disqualified, which led to a formality. By abolishing the monitoring, Putin has converted the elections into a device of the democratic validity from the democratic process, where the results are predetermined and the disagreement is suppressed.
27. Showy presidential election of 2024
The 2024 presidential election in Russia was widely considered by international supervisors and opposition voices. There was no real opposition candidate in this election held on March 17, 2024, as most were imprisoned (eg, Navalni), was deported, or disqualified on technical grounds. The electoral process included internet voting, which was widely considered opaque and susceptible to manipulation, especially without independent surveillance.
Prior to the election, the state-controlled media promoted pro-Putin propaganda, while opposition forums were censors or blocked. There were reports of intimidation of voters, especially among government employees, military personnel and students, who were pressurized to vote or vote by threatening educational punishment.
Kremlin claimed Putin’s huge victory, leading to his rule by 2030, but strict questions were raised on the validity of the election. Western countries refused to consider the election as independent or fair. The 2024 voting gave an example that elections under Putin are not to measure the desire of the people, but to strengthen their complete control, supported by a repressive system that excludes, silences or jailed those who disagree.
28. Militarization of education system
From September 1, 2023, the Russian government began to implement a nationwide militaryization program in schools and universities. Under this initiative, compulsory military-fate education was introduced, including basic weapons training, life defense practice and ideological education of the Russian state and army.
These changes were described as essential for “civil construction” and “patriotic upbringing”. However, critics argued that the curriculum molds children into pro -Kremlin, teaching loyalty to ruling rule, and prepares youths for military recruitment rather than intelligent thinking or civil responsibility.
Youth groups like Unarmia (Youth Army) associated with the Ministry of Defense were expanded. Participation in many areas was made mandatory. Teachers were instructed to monitor the signals of infidelity among the students. Military veterans and publicity officers were kept in schools to strengthen the state’s ideology.
The militarization of education reflects Putin’s effort to strengthen ideological control over the next generation and to normalize the continuous struggle with the West. This makes nationalism institutional, suppresses generous values, and converts educational institutions into state power equipment.
29. Use of mercenary soldiers (Wagner Group) without monitoring
Since 2014, Russia has deployed mercenaries of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Central African Republic and Mali. For nearly a decade, these soldiers were not officially recognized by the state, which led to the denying the responsibility of their actions, while they were used to carry forward the goals of foreign policy in illegal ways.
Wagner’s campaigns included judicial killings, rape, robbery of resources and hanging prisoners, which are often mentioned in leaked videos. Under the leadership of Putin’s former associate Yevgeni Prigozhin, the group served as an unacceptable branch of Kremlin.
In June 2023, the Wagner Group began a short -term rebellion, moving towards Moscow, but later stopped under a compromise talks. Shortly thereafter, Preigozhin died in a suspected plane crash, which is widely believed to be held by the state.
Although Wagner was eventually absorbed into Russia’s official military structure, a long period of irregular campaigns suggests how Putin outsourced repression and violence abroad, avoiding legal accountability and used pseudo forces to fulfill geopolitical objectives. This model reflects the dependence of governance on secret military and ruling practicality.
30. Forcible loyalty by business aristocracy (“elite class management”)
The relationship between Putin and Russian elite has turned the country’s economy into a system where political loyalty determines economic existence. The change began in 2003 with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovski, who was then Russia’s richest person and his political rival. His prosecution indicated that no elite can remain free by challenging Putin.
Since then, the business aristocratic class has been forced to select prosecution, confiscation of property and accept subjugation through threats. Those who obey the command are allowed to maintain money and influence, provided they support the policies of Kremlin – such as funding government projects, supporting war, or promoting propaganda. Those who disagree, have to face exile, bankruptcy, or worse situation.
After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this system of “aristocratic class management” became further intensified, as restrictions separated Russian billionaires from the West. Many people were forced to bring back funds, invest in war efforts, or suffer punishment. Celebrities like Roman Abramovich were confiscated assets abroad, while others were warned not to criticize the Kremlin.
By 2025, this loyal-based economic model has established a mixture of political and economic totalitarianism, where Putin remains the last decisive of power, wealth and privilege in Russia.
31. Disintegration of opposition parties
During the constant strengthening of political power by Vladimir Putin, the opposition parties who made meaningful electoral challenges were declared systematically or illegal. The most prominent among them were Open Russia, which was associated with former elite class and Kremlin critic Mikhail Khodorkovski, and Parnas (People’s Freedom Party), who was associated with opposition leader Boris Nemtsov (who was murdered in 2015).
In 2017, Open Russia was officially declared an “undesirable organization” under a 2015 Russian law, which targeted foreign or politically uncomfortable non-governmental organizations. This classification banned group activities in Russia and declared any association with it a crime.
In later years, security forces arrested open Russian workers repeatedly, raided their homes and blocked their online material. In May 2021, Open Russia announced its self-control to save its members from prosecution, although arrests and monitoring continued even after its closure. Similarly, Parnas faced persistent pressure, surveillance and media sensorship. By 2023, these steps effectively ensure that no legitimate opposition party would be able to challenge the ruling United Russia Party, which has been in an alliance with Putin for a long time.
This disintegration of opposition parties reflects the erosion of democratic institutions of Russia, where competitive multi -party politics is now almost extinct. Elections are held, but the opposition is often banned, imprisoned, or deprived of candidature, leaving only the pro -Kremlin option.
32. Imprisonment for handicap and disagreement of psychiatry
Psychiatry is a very disturbing strategy in modern Russia under Putin’s rule – it reminds us of the use of mental hospitals to silence political dissatisfies by the Soviet Union. Starting around 2019, faster by 2025, several reports came out that the government critics, protesters and informers were mentally disqualified by the state -appointed psychiatrists and closed them in psychiatric institutions without any appropriate legal justification.
For example, activists, who participated in anti-corruption protests or openly criticized Putin’s policies, had to undergo psychological evaluation after sometimes arrest. These assessments, often committed secretly or without independent monitoring, were sometimes taken to hospitalized, heavy unconscious drugs, or indefinite psychiatric custody. In many cases, it served as an alternative to criminal trial – the state would allow individuals to be sidelined without any lawsuit.
A notable case was activist Mikhail Kosenco, who was arrested after a protest and was later sent to a psychiatric hospital, while independent experts declared him mentally healthy. This form of repression not only violates human rights, but also creates fear and silence in the broader worker community.
The return of this abuse of the Soviet style reveals what extent the Russian state can go to suppress disagreement, and use institutional power to discredit and neutralize the alleged enemies.
33. Illegal exile from authorized Ukraine
After a massive invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, the Russian Army also included thousands of Ukrainian citizens – many children – illegally excluded the Russian sector from authorized areas such as Marriupol, Khercheson, Luhansk and Donetsk. These exile confirmed by several international organizations, including the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, violated the international human law, especially the Geneva Convention, which prohibit the forced transfer of the civilian population.
According to Ukraine and many Western governments, Russia adopted strategies such as misleading of civic roads, giving no choice for transfer, or directly seizing people from schools, hospitals and homes. Many children were taken without parents’ consent and placed in Russian spinach care or adopted in Russian families, often snatched away their Ukrainian identity.
Russia portrayed these actions as “human defense”, but the evidence of non-governmental organizations and journalists indicated the intentions and force of eradicating Ukrainian cultural identity. By the end of 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Child Rights Commissioner Maria Lowova-Belova for involvement among these illegal child exile.
These forced population transfer represents severe powerful violations of human rights, in which the war is used as an excuse to manipulate demographics and cultural identity in condensed areas.
34. Memorial International Closure
On December 28, 2021, the Supreme Court of Russia ordered the closure of the country’s oldest and most respected human rights organization, Memorial International. Established in the late 1980s during the final years of the Soviet Union, Memorial was dedicated to preserving the memory of Stalinist repression, supporting political prisoners and documenting the ongoing human rights abuses in Russia.
The official reason for its closure was stated to be repeated violations of Russia’s “foreign agent” laws – a controversial legal structure under which organizations receiving foreign funds were required to labeled themselves as foreign agents, a word that had deep meanings of treason in Soviet period. In fact, this step was widely considered politics inspired. The Memorial Putin was constantly criticizing the repression, military intervention and disagreement of the regime.
This closure caused anger at the international level, condemning the act, many governments and human rights organizations described it as an attempt to eradicate historical memory and suppress civil activity. The liquidation of the memorial indicates a comprehensive tendency to remove the uncomfortable historical narratives and to document the misconduct of the state during the reign of Putin.
This closed represents a fundamental powerist impulse: to destroy the institutions that preserve truth and memory, not only the present, but also the past.
35. Arbitrary legal amendment in favor of Putin
Throughout his tenure, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly manipulated the legal and constitutional system to prolong his rule and expand the executive powers, often bypassing democratic norms and monitoring. In 2012, after a four -year gap as Prime Minister, Putin Dimitri returned to the presidency for four to six years to extended the presidential term for four to six years through a prior amendment passed during the tenure of Medvedev.
In 2020, he oversee widespread constitutional reforms, which again determined the number of his presidential tenure, which could probably remain in power till 2036. These amendments passed through a hasty national polling during the Kovid-19 epidemic expanded the President’s control over the appointments of the judiciary, reduced the power of international law in the Russian courts, and also included populist measures such as banning gay marriage to gain widespread public support.
In 2023, further legal amendments were made to centralize power, curb opposition parties and reduce the freedom of the regional governments. Each of these changes reflects arbitrary governance-without any democratic deliberations or institutional resistance, the law made to benefit any one person.
These manipulations highlight a legal system that is adapted to the powerful stability that weakens the separation of the powers and establishes the structure of lifeless rule under Putin.
36. Suppression of ethnic minorities and migrants
During the reign of Vladimir Putin, ethnic minorities and migrant communities have faced systemic discrimination and state-approved repression. Particularly affected groups include Central Asia (eg Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz), North Caucasus (including Chechen, Ingush and Dagestani) and the large Muslim population of Russia. These communities have often been targeted by arbitrary police raids, racial discrimination and ratioless imprisonment.
After the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis and the 2004 Beslan School siege, after the incidents of checked militants were involved in both – the state state tightened security measures, resulting in indiscriminate action on ethnic minorities. Chechain and other northern Caucasons were tarnished as potential extremists. In cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, the police regularly conducts mass search of migrant laborers, demands bribery, confiscation documents, or deports people without proper legal procedure.
This repression deepened after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when minorities were proportionately recruited during military mobilization. Reports indicate that ethnic groups in remote areas were often targeted for recruitment notice, and they had to face very little resistance due to their political margins.
Thus, Putin’s rule maintains a racial and unequal legal structure, implements the state’s rights over ethnic minorities and migrants and more strictly – which leads to both institutional misconduct and social prejudice.
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